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1. INTRODUCTION
First introduced in the discussions concerning European inte-
gration in the 1975 Report on European Union submitted to the
Council of Ministers by the European Commission,' the principle
of subsidiarity 2 made its first official appearance in the Single
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See Bull. Eur. Communities Comm'n Supp. 5/75, at 10-11. For a brief
history of the principle of subsidiarity in modern European discussions, see
A.G.Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1079, 1088-89 (1992), and Deborah Z. Cass,The Word That Saves
Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the
European Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107, 1112-16 (1992).
2 Subsidiarity is an old concept. The ideas of federalism and subsidiarity
were first brought together in F ieen Federalists by the Franciscan Johannes
Eberlin in 1521. See Ludger Kiihnhardt, Federalism and Subsidiarity, TELOS,
Spring 1992, at 77, 80. The name of Johannes Althusius is also associated with
early discussions of subsidiarity and rightly so, even though Althusius does not
appear to have made use of the word itself. Althusius conceived of the body
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European Act signed in 1986 and implemented on July 1, 1987,
3
to acquire definitive official status in the Maastricht Treaty which
came into effect on November 1, 1993. Article 3b of that Treaty
defines the principle in the following way:
4
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives as-
signed to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can there-
fore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed ac-
tion, be better achieved by the Community. Any action
politic as made up of five groupings: two private (the family and the collegium)
and three public (the city, the province, and the commonwealth). See generally
JOHANNES ALTHuSIus, POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA ET EXEMPLIS SACRIS
ET PROFANIS ILLUSTRATA (1603). Because he assigned responsibilities to each
grouping on the basis of what he believed were the capacities of each body to
discharge them, he is considered an early contributor to an understanding of
the concept. See generally Daniel J. Elazar, The Multi-Faceted Covenant: The Bib-
lical Approach to the Problem of Organizations, Constitutions, and Liberty as Re-
flected in the Thought offohannes Althusius, 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 187 (1991)
(describing the form of civil society in the Althusian view). The modern con-
ception of subsidiarity stems from Catholic social doctrine and is elaborated in
the papal encyclicals. See, e.g., POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931),
reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, 1903-1939, at 415 (Claudia Carlen ed. &
trans., 1981).
3 See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741
(1987) (amending TREATY ESTABLISHING EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM-
MUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11) [hereinafter SEA]. In reality, the
principle of subsidiarity made a nominal appearance in 1984 when, pressed by
Altiero Spinelli (one of the main proponents of European federilism), the
European Parliament adopted a Draft Treaty establishing the European Union.
See Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, art. 12(2), 1984 O.J. (C 77)
33, 38. In paragraph nine of the Preamble of this Draft Treaty, subsidiarity was
mentioned by name for the first time. See id. pmbl., para. 9. The first direct
application of the principle to a specific area, namely to environmental protec-
tion, was made in Article 130r of-the Single European Act. See SEA, art. 130r
(4) (stating that "[the Community shall take action relating to the environment
to the extent to which [its] objectives can be attained better at [the] Community
level than at the level of the individual states").
4 See Toth, supra note 1, at 1086 ("[T]here are at least three other references





by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
5
This definition makes clear that the principle of subsidiarity
relates to the question of the assignment of powers to governing
bodies located at different jurisdictional tiers in governmental sys-
tems, though the Treaty itself does not assign any powers.6 This
is the only thing that the definition makes clear. Expressions such
as "if... the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
Member States" and "the scale or effects of the proposed action"
in the above definition are open to many interpretations.
7
Moreover, as Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek have
noted, from the mid 1970s until the late 1980s, the principle was
used "to justify the enlargement of the competences of the European
Commission,"8 and only in the 1990s did "subsidiarity evolve[]
into a principle for curbing the potential expansion of power of
the European Commission."9 Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty
is at present generally interpreted as expressing a principle that
calls for decentralization. Even if that is granted-Article 3b can
easily be read as supporting some centralization-it is not clear
how the principle of subsidiarity is to play that role. The ques-
tion that begs for an answer is the following: in what specific way
does the principle of subsidiarity relate to the assignment of pow-
ers and how can it affect the assignment and reassignment of these
powers?
The basic assumption of this Article is that the principle of
subsidiarity and the answer to the above question belong to a the-
ory of the decentralization (or of centralization) of powers in
5 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, art.
3b, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
6 See generally id We use the expression "governmental systems" to refer
to the apparatus of state in its entirety, including central, provincial or state and
municipal governments. We also include special authorities (termedsyndicats in
France, consorzi in Italy, and special districts in the United States) that may be
responsible for schools, fire protection, police, public transportation, water,
sewerage, libraries, hospitals, and cemeteries. Governmental systems, therefore,
include confederal, federal, and unitary states as well as structures, like the
European Union, which are neither confederal, federal, nor unitary.
7 EC TREATY art. 3b.
Kees van Kersbergen & BertjaA Verbeek, The Politics of Subsidiarity in the
European Union, 32 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 215, 216 (1994.
9 Id.
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governmental systems.'0 The assumption is a natural one to make
if one accepts that subsidiarity pertains to the assignment of pow-
ers.1 Though natural, the assumption has strength only if a the-
ory of decentralization is available. As this Article proceeds, the
emergence of a theory of decentralization will become evident.
Enough of it is currently available to allow us to ascribe an im-
portant strategic role to the principle of subsidiarity. Before do-
ing this, this Article asks whether subsidiarity can be given a role
in two currently accepted models of decentralization of govern-
mental systems.
This Article begins with a review of the conventional public
economics explanation of the reasons why governmental systems
are or should be decentralized. Section 2 reviews the
"Decentralization Theorem" which has been and remains central
to that analysis. Section 3 examines a decentralization model de-
rived from an application of the theory of incomplete contracts to
governmental systems. Section 4 considers a model of decentrali-
zation based on the assumption that politics and intergovernmen-
tal relations are competitive. Section 5 situates the principle of
subsidiarity in its historical context to understand the meaning
currently given to it, and suggests a role for the principle in the
10 Assignments pertain to powers, that is to the authority to design and
implement policies in particular domains of activity. They do not relate to
policies, uns a power is capable of housing no more than a single policy. If a
senior government appoints an agent at a junior level (for example, an adminis-
trative body) to imp ement one or more policies it itself designs, that isnot an
assignment. Assignments may or may not be entrenched in a constitutional
document. Although such entrenchments or their absence will affect how as-
signment mechanisms, see infra Section 4.1., operate, they are irrelevant to the
question of how to define and analyze assignments.
Many authors assume, as we do, that subsidiarity pertains to the assign-
ment problem. See, e.g., CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH,
MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY: HOW MUCH CENTRALIZATION FOR
EUROPE? (1993) [hereinafter MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY]; Jacques
Cremer et al., The Decentralization of Public Services: Lessons from the Theory of
the Firm, in DECENTRALIZING INFRASTRUCTURE: ADVANTAGES AND
LIMITATIONS (Antonio Estache ed., World Bank Discussion Paper No. 290,
1995); George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the Euro-
pean Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Cass,
supra note 1; Kiihnhardt, supra note 2; Paul Seabright, Accountability and De-
centralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model, 40 EURO. ECON.
REV. 61 (1996); Hans-Werner Sinn, How Much Europe? Subsidiarity Centraliza-





competition model of decentralization. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. THE CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS
Among the hodgepodge of propositions which constitute the
conventional public economics explanation of why we should ob-
serve decentralization of governmental systems, there is one,
which Wallace Oates has labeled the "decentralization theorem,"
that occupies a special place in the literature of fiscal federalism.'
2
After first reviewing that theorem, this Article will examine the
assumptions on which it rests before looking at what the conven-
tional analysis reveals about the principle of subsidiarity.
2.1. The Theorem
At the outset, the decentralization theorem accepts the Mus-
gravian assumption that an analysis of decentralization requires
that governments be decomposed into three branches: the alloca-
tion, the redistribution, and the stabilization branches. 3 In the
canonical version, there are no benefits to the decentralization of
the redistribution and stabilization branches. To put it more pre-
cisely, the disadvantages of decentralization so greatly exceed the
advantages, that whoever or whatever assigns powers would al-
ways assign redistribution and stabilization to the central authori-
ties.
14
To "prove" the theorem that there are benefits to the decen-
tralization of some fraction of the allocation branch, four assump-
tions are needed. First, it is assumed that central governments are
"obliged"'" to provide uniformly the goods and services they actu-
12 See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 35-37 (William J. Baumol
ed., 1972).
13 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A
STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 5-6 (1959).
14 See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMS (1969); OATES,
supra note 12. Some writers have argued that redistribution need not be com-
pl-etely centralized. See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local
Public Good, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 35, 36 (1973). Others have recognized a role to
sub-central governments in stabilization. See, e.g., Edward M. Gramlich, Feder-
alism and Federal Deficit Reduction, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 299 (1987). To account
for these exceptions, we refer to a canonical version of the theorem.
15 The word "obliged" is from Tocqueville. See OATES, supra note 12, at
31. In the original, the term is "le lgislateur est oblig.." ALEXIS DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: TOME 1194 (1835/1850). In his transla-
tion, George Lawrence renders Tocqueville's sentence as "the lawgiver is
19981
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ally supply across their entire jurisdictions. Second, it is assumed
that there is an inverse monotone relationship between the degree
of homogeneity of preferences within jurisdictions and the size of
jurisdictions. 6 Third, it is assumed that there are no interjurisdic-
tional spillovers. Finally, it is assumed that the goods and services
supplied by senior and junior governments are produced at con-
stant costs and provided to citizens at identical tax prices.
Given these four assumptions, it is easy to see the virtues of
decentralization. The example of snow removal will illustrate.
The central government in Rome is "obliged" to provide the serv-
ice uniformly. Consequently, it removes snow from the streets of
Turin which are blanketed with snow virtually every winter, as
well as from the streets of Catania which seldom, if ever, see any
snow.17  Decentralization allows for snow removal in Turin
where the population has a preference for its removal and for no
snow removal in Catania, where the population cannot want it to
be removed. Preferences are therefore better satisfied with decen-
tralization, and welfare is consequently greater.
2.2. A Critical Assessment
The fourth assumption, which pertains to equal cost of sup-
ply, is innocuous. Indeed, allowing differences in supply costs
will not affect the theorem. Therefore, this Article examines only
the first three assumptions concerning uniformity of supply, ho-
mogeneity of preferences, and interjurisdictional spillovers. Such
an examination reveals the true worth of the theorem. It also
helps an appreciation of the value of other theories of decentrali-
zation which make use of these assumptions, either together or
singularly.
bound" which has the same meaning as "is obliged" and "est obligL" ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 161 (George Lawrence trans. &
Anchor Books ed., 1969). Oates could also have quoted Tocqueville's assertion
that "every central government worships uniformity." Id. at 673. In the origi-
nal, that statement reads "tout governement central adore l'uniformite."
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: TOME II 333
(1840/1850).
16 See infra Section 2.2.2. (discussing two factors that make for a greater
homogeneity of preferences at junior rather than at senior levels of govern-
ment .
We are aware that snow cannot be removed from where it has not fallen,
but that snowplows pushing air will be driven through the streets of Catania is





According to Oates, the uniformity assumption is satisfied as a
matter of definition.' 8 He argues that if the central government
can replicate the supply of goods and services undertaken by jun-
ior governments, then "in terms of [his] economic definition of
federalism,... this is equivalent to the operation of a federal sys-
tem with a decision-making unit for each jurisdiction."19 Thus,
Oates "associate[s] centralized decision-making with a uniform
level of consumption of public goods across all jurisdictions."
20
This is far from satisfactory.
In more recent literature, the uniformity assumption contin-
ues to play a fundamental role in discussions of decentralization,
and is apparently taken to reflect the real world. Alan Hamlin,
who diagnoses weaknesses2' in the conventional analysis of decen-
tralization, nevertheless accepts that central governments are
"constrained to adopt policies that apply uniformly across the en-
tire population."2 Others take the assumption to mean that "the
central government is assumed to be institutionally compelled to
adopt a uniformity constraint in service delivery"-a constraint
that signals "government failure."23 Paul Seabright rejects the
strong formulation of the assumption as "empirically false." 24 In-
stead, he claims value for a weaker version which states "that cen-
tralized political systems do tend to implement policies that are
regionally more uniform than decentralized ones.
18 See OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 12, at 35-38 (defining the as-
sumptions underlying his decentralization theorem); see also CLIFF WALSH,
FISCAL FEDERALISM: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND A DISCUSSION OF THEIR
RELEVANCE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5 (1992) (recognizing that, in
OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 12, uniform supply by central gov-
ernments is definitional).
19 OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 12, at 37 n.9 (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 See discussion infra.
22 Alan P. Hamlin, Decentralization, Competition and the Efficiency of Fed-
eralism, ECON. REC., Sept. 1991, at 193, 194.
23 Cremer et al., supra note 11, at 99.
24 Seabright, supra note 11, at 63.
2 Id. It is not clear whether the uniformity assumption is supposed to ap-
ply only to central governments or whether it also reflects what provincil,
state, or even local governments do. We will see later that the way this ques-
tion is addressed is not without consequences. See infra Section 2.2.2.
1998]
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These statements notwithstanding, it is difficult to know what
the assumption really means. In considering a single-tier unitary
governmental system, it makes little sense to assume that the
unique government of that system is "obliged," "compelled," or
"constrained" to remove snow where none actually falls. Only
Seabright's formulation of the uniformity assumption makes
sense in such a context. In focusing on multi-tier governmental
systems,26 even Seabright's weaker formulation of the assumption
will not do. Some uniformity in these systems does not prove
that more uniformity is provided than the citizens require and/or
desire. For example, in Canada, the federal government has the
power to decide on capital punishment, 27 and it has elected to uni-
21formly proscribe capital punishment across the whole country.
However, in the United States, the state governments hold that
power, with "oversight" by the Supreme Court. As a conse-
quence, states vary considerably in the incidence of executions
and in the manner of these executions. Still, one cannot assume-
but must demonstrate-that Canadians are "obliged" or
"compelled" to uniformity in this matter. In a fundamental sense,
the American treatment of capital punishment was, and remains,
available to Canadians, but so far they have not adopted it.
29
Samuelsonian public goods must be provided uniformly.30
These public goods include international diplomacy, national de-
fense (as deterrence), and exchange rate policies.3 ' The observa-
tion of uniformity regarding these services does not demonstrate
that central governments are "obliged" or "constrained" to supply
26 With the exception of the seven larger conurbations in England
(Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Newcastle, and Shef-
field), Northern Ireland, and, since April 1996, Scotland and Wales, all multi-
tier governmental systems of democratic societies have more than two levels.
Most have four or more, even if we count as tiers only those whose politicians
are opularly elected, which is a very restrictive conception of tiers.
See Constitution Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3, § 91 (27) (Eng.).
28 See Act of 1976, 1974-1975-1976 S.C. 105 (Can.); see also PETER W.
HOGG, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW IN CANADA 1137 (3d ed. 1992).
29 In Canada, under the power it has to regulate the fisheries, the federal
government not only implements different policies for different fish stocks, but
also pursues different policy objectives on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. See
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33 (1985) (Can.); Atlantic Fish-
eries Restructuring Act, R.S.C., ch. A-14 (1985) (Can.).
30 See Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.





goods and services uniformly. The unit costs of producing some
goods and services fall when they are produced uniformly and in
large volume. Tax collection is an example. The observation of
uniformity in these cases cannot establish that central govern-
ments are "compelled" to adopt uniform provisions. Finally,
governments uniformly provide goods and services which are nei-
ther public nor produced under conditions of decreasing unit cost
because citizens want uniform provision. These include the right
to a passport and the right to privacy. Each of these rights could
easily be decentralized. Therefore, to argue that the powers
which regulate these rights should be decentralized and diversified
is to argue that citizens can never have a preference for uniform-
ity.
Three institutions of governmental systems shed light on the
question of uniform supply: concurrency, standards, and field ad-
ministration. We first look at concurrency. Concurrency means
that governments share powers to achieve a degree of uniformity
consistent with technical requirements, such as publicness and
scale economies, and the preferences of citizens, while sacrificing a
minimum of diversity. To understand the meaning of this insti-
tution, one must recognize that governments assign powers, not
policies, to jurisdictional tiers.3 The assignment of a power
grants the authority to design and implement policies in a particu-
lar domain. Assigning power over agriculture or education, for
example, grants the authority to legislate in matters pertaining to
these policy domains. It is because powers, not policies, are as-
signed that there can be concurrency. In other words, it is possi-
ble for a part of the authority to legislate in regards to agriculture
and education to be centralized and at the same time for another
part of that authority to be decentralized.
Concurrency sheds light on uniformity in another way. Sup-
pose that a central government provides policies uniformly under
the part of the authority it has been assigned and that the prov-
inces or states do the same under their allotted part of authority.
As long as the degree of concurrency is adjusted to reflect changes
32 Uniformity of certain variables can also be found in the marketplace. A
notorious case is the fixed uniform sales commissions that govern residential
real estate transactions between sellers and brokers in Canada and the United
States. See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflict in Agency Arrangements:
Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 503-39 (1993) (explaining this uniformity without assuming collusion).
33 See supra note 10.
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in the relevant circumstances, it is still impossible to argue that
the central government was "compelled" to uniformity. The
prevalence of concurrent powers therefore provides prima facie
evidence that central governments are not "constrained" or
"obliged" to provide goods and services uniformly.
We now turn our attention to standards. A central govern-
ment can apply uniform minimum or maximum standards across
its entire jurisdiction with respect to certain policy dimensions
while allowing diversity in others. For example, in Canada, pro-
vincial governments have power over health, with the exception
of responsibility over military hospitals and health in the north-
ern territories. Under that power, the provinces severally have
provided their citizens with public health programs. At the na-
tional level, however, the Canadian Parliament passed the Canada
Health Act, which "forces" some uniformity on provincial pro-
grams.14  The federal government was not "compelled" to pass
and implement that Act, except in the sense that if it had not done
so, it would have risked defeat at the ballot box. The Act, which
calls for some uniform minimum standards in some areas, respects
diversity in others. The presence of standards, like the use of
concurrency, does not demonstrate that a uniformity constraint
binds central governments. Rather it shows that central govern-
ments have freedom in the matter. 3
Finally, there is field administration, or field service. Often
central governments assert control over the financing and the
overall design of a policy, but give discretionary authority to an
administrator in the field (such as a prefect) who then implements
the policy in a way that respects local conditions. As a conse-
quence, the policy, though formally uniform, is varied in its ap-
plication. This institution also shows that central governments
are not "compelled" to uniformity.
2.2.2. Homogeneity
Two factors can, but need not, produce a greater homogeneity
of preferences at junior rather than senior levels of government.
The first is a total absence of mobility among isolated communi-
" See Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch. C-6 (1985).
3 This is equivalent to supposing that the decisions of central governments
are not determined by the meian voter, because if these decisions were made
by that voter, the supply of goods and services would be uniform. We are




ties. Assume that over time, propinquity within local communi-
ties generates uniform preferences and that the absence of interac-
tion among the communities results in different preferences.
Formation of a higher level jurisdiction over these communities
creates a two-tier governmental system. The result is an inverse
monotone relationship between the homogeneity of preferences
within communities at the lower level and jurisdictional size
when moving from lower to higher levels. The inverse relation-
ship will continue to hold when moving from a two- to a three-
or four-tier system. In the case of an immobile population appor-
tioned among isolated communities, one can assume the existence
of an inverse relationship between the size of jurisdictions and in-
tra-community homogeneity of preferences. However, this situa-
tion does not appear to be widespread in contemporary societies.
The second factor that can produce an inverse relationship be-
tween homogeneity and size is unfettered fiscal or Tiebout mobil-
ity.36 At the lowest tier of governmental systems, fiscal mobility
can sort the population by preferences and homogenize commu-
nities at that tier; however, this is inherently impossible at higher
tiers.3 7 When moving from two-tier to three-tier systems, the in-
verse relationship becomes impossible because effective fiscal mo-
bility is no longer possible. For example, if one wants to live in
38Milan, one must live in Lombardy and in Italy. Four or more
tiers worsens matters. The pervasiveness of multi-tier govern-
mental systems robs Tiebout mobility of the capacity to generate
the inverse relationship between homogeneity and size needed by
the decentralization theorem.
Any heterogeneity of preferences at the local level means that,
in supplying goods and services, local governments must resolve
the same problems that confront central governments. If the as-
36 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1957) (advancing the theory that mobility between communities is
a mechanism through which citizens reveal their preferences for local public
goods).
37 Central, provincial or state, or metropolitan governments can use Tie-
bout mobility as a preference revelation mechanism. In other words, any one
of these governments can diversify its policies and allow the population to sort
itself by policy types. However, in three- or higher-tier systems, only one gov-
ernment--the central or the state or the metropolitan--can avail itself of this
mechanism.
38 It is, of course, always possible to salvage Tiebout mobility. All one has
to do is assume that Milans exist everywhere so that if one wanted to live in Mi-
lan but also in Arkansas, one could do so.
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sumption of uniform provision applies to central governments
only, then local governments could diversify supply to satisfy
idiosyncratic preferences. But then, any argument that local gov-
ernments can diversify will apply to central governments as well,
and the case for decentralization will simply vanish. If the uni-
formity assumption applies to all governments, then decentraliza-
tion will not be able, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences
at the local level, to diversify supply. In this case also, the advan-
tages of decentralization disappear.
2.2.3. Spillovers
The assumption that there are no interjurisdictional spillovers
gives power or relief to the decentralization theorem, but it is dis-
pensable. Allowing spillovers, however, requires the introduction
of coordination and coordination costs to the analysis, concepts
which have played no role in the conventional analysis.3 9 And
for good reason. As is now recognized, if coordination costs are
given the absolutely essential role that Albert Breton and An-
thony Scott argued a theory of decentralization recognizing the
pervasiveness of spillovers had to give these costs, 40 the theory
must also include other "organizational" or "transactional costs.
The analysis of decentralization based on this "theorem" then be-
comes not only outmoded, but misleading.
2.3. Subsidiarity in the Conventional Model
The authors of this Article do not believe that the conven-
tional analysis supports the argument that decentralization is
beneficial. To the contrary, the assumptions of the conventional
approach of uniformity in central government supply as well as
the assumption of a negative relation between intrajurisdiction
homogeneity and jurisdictional size, are too much at variance
In Musgrave's discussion of decentralization, spillovers play a major role
and the necessity of coordination, which he calls "cooperation," is recognized,
but plays no analytical role. See MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMs, supra note 14, at
299-304.
40 See generally ALBERT BRETON & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE ECONOMIC
CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL STATES (1978) [hereinafter BRETON & SCOTT,
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION].
41 See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy
of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 76-80 (Dennis C. Muel-
ler ed., 1997) (explaining that coordination and other organizational costs must




with what we observe in the world. Consequently, the conven-
tional analysis cannot provide a foundation for a theory of decen-
tralization of governmental systems that permits an appraisal of
the virtues of decentralization. Furthermore, because it requires
something like fiscal or Tiebout mobility to generate the neces-
sary intrajurisdiction homogeneity, and because of the inherent
impossibility of Tiebout mobility in governmental systems of
three or more tiers, the conventional model fosters a tendency to
think of governmental systems as two-tier systems. This ten-
dency often leads analysts to overlook some genuine virtues of de-
centralization.
If efficiency can be improved by assigning some powers to
senior governments and others to junior governments, someone
or something must undertake the task of implementing the as-
signments. The earlier literature assumed that, once specified, as-
signments would somehow implement themselves. 2 Conse-
quently, that literature did not discuss the question of who or
what implemented them. When Breton and Scott first recognized
the problem, it was "solved" by the creation of a "constituent as-
sembly" that was presumed capable of executing assignments by
minimizing organizational costs. These costs were defined as
those incurred by citizens to signal their preferences and to move
from community to community, plus the costs of public admini-
stration and of intergovernmental coordination associated with
alternative assignments. 43  The absence of ongoing, cost-
minimizing constituent assemblies in the real world robbed that
solution of much of its value.
44
Alan Hamlin accepts an augmented version of the conven-
tional decentralization theorem, which he calls the
"decentralization thesis," as "idealized federalism."45 In particular,
he refers to the "idealized federal outcome" as the outcome that a
42 See, e.g., OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 12; Albert Breton, A
Theory of Government Grants, 31 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 175, 178 (1965)
[hereinafter Breton, Government Grants] (assuming that the division of powers
followed automatically from the presumed hierarchy of public goods).
3 See generally BRETON & SCOTT, ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION, supra note
40.
44 For development of this point, see ALBERT BRETON & ANTHONY
SCOTT, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS (1980) [hereinafter BRETON & SCOTT,
DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS].
45 Alan P. Hamlin, Decentralization, Competition and the Efficiency of Fed-
eralism, ECON. REC., Sept. 1991, at 193, 194.
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"procedural mechanism" should implement, 46 somewhat as per-
fectly competitive markets implement the idealized outcomes of
the First and Second Theorems of Welfare Economics. 47 Ham-
lin's discussion of procedural mechanisms does not, however, ad-
dress the assignment problem. Hamlin analyzes mechanisms,
based on one sort of mobility or the other, that match heteroge-
neous froupings of persons with supply sources of impure public
goods. This is a partitioning, not an assignment, problem. In
the absence of an assignment mechanism, it is not possible to find
a habitat and a role for the principle of subsidiarity.49 This Arti-
cle later discusses procedural mechanisms, or assignment mecha-
nisms, to address the assignment problem.
3. THE CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
The theory of decentralization of governmental systems pro-
posed by a 1993 Report of the London-based Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research derives from the theory of incomplete
contracts.5 0 This Section will first outline the model proposed in
that Report and in subsequent studies, then offer some criticisms,
and finally will inquire into what the contractual model has to say
about subsidiarity.
3.1. The Model
The framework in which the problem is formulated is familiar
to students of contract theory. Citizens, as the principals in a
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 These include, for example, local, regional, and national goods. Id. at
196-204.
49 See OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 12; Wallace E. Oates, Feder-
alism and Government Finance, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 126 (Tohn M.
Quigly & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994). In his more recent survey of studies
on fiscal federalism, Oates appears to be even less aware of the necessity of an
assignment mechanism than -he was in his earlier work. Compare Oates, Feder-
alism and Government Finance, supra, with OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra
note 12, at 22141. Although the early work does not propose an assignment
mechanism, it offers an insightful discussion of some of the forces that would
impact on such a mechanism. It is noteworthy that in the recent survey neither
the work of BRETON & SCOTT, ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 40,
nor that of Hamlin, supra note 45, are mentioned.
50 See MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 11, at 9 (citing the im-





principal-agent relationship, need politicians and bureaucrats or
governments as agents to provide them with some of the goods
and services they desire. They can hire senior or junior govern-
ments. Two assumptions are basic to the decisions of principals.
First, although central governments have the means to garner as
much or more information about the preferences of citizens as
have junior governments, they have only a weak incentive to col-
lect that information. 5 Second, although central governments
can replicate, even exactly, the provision of goods and services
undertaken by junior governments, they lack the incentive to do
SO.
The absence of incentive has, in both cases, a common root:
the incompleteness of implicit (informal) or explicit (formal) con-
tracts that citizens and governments must sign with each other if
desired goods and services are to be forthcoming. Incompleteness
means that some information which is possibly observable by the
principals and the agents, is not verifiable by third parties and, as
a consequence, cannot usefully be specified in the contract. One
implication of this incompleteness is that even if citizens know
that they have been made worse off by, for example, an overly
uniform provision of a service by a senior government, it is not
possible for them to appeal to the courts for redress. This is be-
cause the courts cannot conclude that citizens have been made
worse off when the information is unverifiable. As a conse-
quence, the provision of the service that made citizens worse off
may "be subject to electoral review but not to judicial review."
52
Electoral review is available because the model assumes that it
is possible--certainly easier-for residents of junior jurisdictions
to control their local governments through the ballot box than
for them to control their central government through the same
device, thus making junior governments more accountable. To
put the matter differently, citizens at the local level5 3 can defeat
51 See Jacques Cr'mer et al., The Decentralization of Public Services: Lessons
from the Theory of the Firm, in DECENTRALIZATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS 107 (Antonio Estache ed., 1995) (arguing that
central governments have the means to collect more information about prefer-
ence than local governments can collect).
52 Seabright, supra note 11, at 64.
53 These citizens must have roughly the same preferences. See id. at 67 n.10
("[Tihe assumption that localities can be characterized by a single welfare func-
tion can be thought of as implying that mobility has already played a part in
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
their local government at the ballot box if that government has
not performed satisfactorily. However, if the central government
has not performed to their satisfaction, these same citizens will
not be able to prevail if that government can rely on the support
of citizens in other jurisdictions who feel happy with the central
government's performance.
It is this phenomenon which is said to deprive central gov-
ernments of the incentive to collect information from citizens
about their preferences and to diversify the supply of goods and
services to satisfy these preferences. Put differently, junior gov-
ernments are more effective than senior governments at gathering
from citizens the information needed to make "good" decisions.
While senior governments cannot credibly commit not to later
use the information collected from citizens to the disadvantage of
those same citizens, junior governments can so commit.5 4 The
point is illustrated with the example of prosperous localities will-
ing to reveal their large taxable capacity to junior governments. If
these governments use that information to levy "unacceptably
high" taxes from them, the citizens of the prosperous localities
will simply defeat these governments at the next election.
55
Conversely, the senior governments, not susceptible to elec-
toral defeat by a single locality, cannot credibly commit never to
use the knowledge of the locality's taxable capacity to levy
"unacceptably high" taxes in the future. Electoral review begets
the accountability of junior governments and insures that these
governments are more accountable than senior governments. Ac-
countability being a virtue, it follows that the provision of goods
and services by governments should be decentralized.
There is a trade-off, however. Decentralization, as recognized
for over a quarter of a century, 56 produces interjurisdictional spil-
lovers such as those associated with consumption externalities and
unexploited economies of scale.5 7 Older approaches to decentrali-
sorting the population so that a reasonable degree of homogeneity of prefer-
ences characterizes single localities.").
54 See MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 11, at 7, 41-43, 84.
5 See id. at 7, 42 (noting that "decentralization allows voters in a locality to
decide collectively to replace their government if they are dissatisfied wit its
performance").
56 See generally MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMS, supra note 14; Gordon Tul-
lock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, PUB. CHOICE, Spring 1969, at 19.
57 See OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 12, at 46-47; Breton, Gov-




zation 58 would argue, at this juncture, that junior governments
should deal with these spillovers, cost permitting, through coor-
dination. As expected, the contractual approach visualizes the re-
lationship between junior governments engaging in coordination
as built on a contract which is, again as a matter of necessity, in-
complete. As a consequence, little intergovernmental coordina-
tion can be expected. In the contractual approach to decentraliza-
tion, coordination is achieved through the centralization of
powers and, therefore, is bought at the price of diminished ac-
countability.
3.2. A Critical Assessment
Notwithstanding the contribution it makes to our understand-
ing of the decentralization of governmental systems, the contrac-
tual model is led to very restrictive notions of accountability and
coordination because it neglects the competitive nature of politics
and of intergovernmental relations.
3.2.1. Accountability
While recognizing that in practice competition in politics and
intergovernmental relations is often less than perfect, it must also
be acknowledged that it is seldom absent.5 9 Given that the analy-
sis of polar cases usually facilitates the appreciation of the effects
of any particular force, this Article assumes that politics and in-
tergovernmental relations are genuinely competitive. Having
made the assumption, it is no longer possible to hold the view
that the actions of a central government in a particular locality
will remain the private information of that government and of
the citizens of that locality. For example, the proposition that
58 See, e.g., BRETON & SCOTT, ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 40.
59 For example, Wittman argues correctly, in our view, that a significant
volume of information is transmitted to voters by competing political entre-
preneurs seeking the support of these voters. See DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE
MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 10 (1995). If we follow this view, we have to
accept that entrepreneurship will be more limited under coalition governments.
Still, as others have been able to document, voters recognize the differential
contribution of coalition members to the supply of goods and services and vote
accordingly. See Arthur Schram & Frans Van Winden, Revealed Preferences for
Public Goods: Applying a Model of Voter Behavior, 60 PUB. CHOICE 259, 280
(1989) (finding that Dutch voters imputed responsibility to a particular gov-
emnment party even when the party was part of a coalition). Competition,
though diminished, is not extinguished.
19981
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
senior governments cannot credibly commit not to use informa-
tion (on, for example, taxable capacity) against citizens at some fu-
ture date rests on the assumption that the "misuse" of the infor-
mation never becomes public or common knowledge. If, indeed,
the misuse of the information by senior governments was to be-
come public, these governments could be severely damaged by the
revelation. This alone makes it possible for senior governments
to credibly commit not to misuse information and, therefore, to
collect it.
Many students of Public Choice assume that collective choices
are made at the ballot box and only there--the authors of the Re-
port of the Centre for Economic Policy Research make the same
assumption.60 Because of this, the commitment mechanism they
have constructed is based exclusively on voting. They failed to
find a place in their model for the on-going competition between
opposition politicians located at all jurisdictional levels and other
governments of a given system. Nor do they find a place for the
competition that derives from parliamentary debates, commis-
sions of inquiry, investigative journalism, standing committees of
legislative assemblies, the "question period" of parliamentary gov-
ernments, freedom of information legislation, or from the compe-
tition based on the capacity of citizens-helped by the political
media, by academics, and by other observers of the political
scene-to observe what is happening in other jurisdictions.
If they had, they would have had to accept the view that the
unsatisfactory performance of a central government can become
public knowledge. 6 ' They would then have had to recognize that
that knowledge would, in turn, negatively affect the probability
that citizens-at the limit, all citizens of the senior jurisdic-
tion-would grant their consent or their votes to the central gov-
ernment. If we assume that this government maximizes expected
consent (or, expected votes), the transformation of private infor-
mation about the unsatisfactory performance of a central gov-
ernment in a particular locality (and of any senior government,
such as a provincial or state government) into public information
through the force of competition, must be seen as making that
central government accountable.
60 See, e.g., MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 11, at 42.




That argument can be formalized. Suppose that for the gov-
erning party (a), expected consent at time t is ECt defined as the
sum over all citizens (I) ( = 1,... J) of the probability ntt that j
will grant his or her consent to party a, namely ECat = : . (7 1 >
7t : 0 ). If 7t is a function of "bad news" (N), then 7t- = f (N)
with f continuous and twice differentiable. If faN < 0 (i. e. bad
news reduces the probability that j will grant her or his consent to
a) and if iPN > 0 (i.e. if bad news increases the probability that j
will grant her or his consent to the opposition party b), then the
public revelation of unsatisfactory performance will make that in-
formation politically verifiable. If we assume that expected votes
are proportional to EC, the argument holds for a model in which
politics is restricted to voting. It is competition that begets ac-
countability. Additionally, competition makes all governments
accountable, whatever tier they inhabit.
3.2.2. Coordination
There are many contractual agreements aimed at securing co-
ordination that are plagued by free-riding, cheating, hold-ups, and
other problems of that sort which, to abbreviate, this Article will
call "shirking." This plague arises because shirkers can expect to
benefit from coordination without having to pay their share of
the costs. Consequently, these contractual agreements have to be
monitored, with sanctions imposed on the miscreants. As moni-
toring is costly, some shirking will remain in equilibrium, which
undermines the initial contractual agreement and the coordina-
tion it is supposed to deliver. In this way, shirking robs agree-
ments of their credibility. Additionally, coordination may be
made more difficult if policies have different distributional impli-
cations. Still, contractual agreements are more likely to develop
when the number of parties to an agreement is small (which facili-
tates trust among the parties), when policies are more precisely
defined,63 and when interjurisdictional spillovers are small and
can be measured easily.
6 4
It must be recognized that in addition to the above, competi-
tion will motivate coordination or, to put it differently, will lead
to less shirking. Suppose that the relations between governments
62 See MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 11, at 39, 135-37.
63 See id. at 138-39.
' See id. at 136.
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are competitive and that all governments maximize expected con-
sent. Assume further that expected consent depends on the costs
(C) at which goods and services are provided in such a way that
when costs are lower, the expectation of consent is higher and
vice versa. That is if we re-write f (-) above as 7c'at = f (N, C) we
have fPc < 0 and i& > 0. Under these circumstances, given that
monitoring is costly, shirking by a government will lead to a re-
duction in its expected consent. That government, as well as all
the others in the system, therefore has an incentive not to shirk.
Indeed, if the expected consent function is very sensitive to
changes in the costs of goods and services, shirking may be all but
extinguished.
As The Federalist Papers so well understood, intergovernmental
competition can only be beneficial and lead to stable outcomes if
it is regulated by an "umpire."65 The Federalist Papers assigned the
responsibility to act as umpire to central governments.66 In terms
of the problem under discussion, the cost of monitoring will be
less when central governments umpire intergovernmental compe-
tition. Then, there will be more coordination. Properly umpired
competition can therefore reduce and possibly eliminate shirking.
That is the reason why we observe so much coordination in gov-
ernmental systems.
Others make no such observation.67 Their perception, as is to
be expected, is colored by what is happening in the European Un-
ion, a governmental system in which intergovernmental relations
are only moderately competitive and in which there is no effec-
tive umpire. The consequent difficulties of coordination through
contractual agreement lead proponents of the contractual ap-
proach to advocate coordination through centralization. Why?
Because when a power is centralized in the European Union, it is
in effect assigned to the Council of Ministers.6 ' The Council is
responsible for coordinating the interests of the governments that
65 THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Random House
1937)
66 See id.; see also George J. Stigler, The Tenable Range of Functions of Local
Governments, in SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POL'Y, JOINT ECON. COMM.,
FED. EXPENDITURE POL'Y FOR ECON. GROwTH & STABILrIY 213 (1957).
67 See generally MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 11; Cre'mer et
al., supra note 11; Seabright, supra note 11.
It is true that the Commission has the power to propose and that the
Parliament possesses the power of disallowance. Nevertheless, decisions ulti-




appoint them and, ultimately, the interests of the citizens of their
respective countries.
However, this is not what generally happens in governmental
systems, especially federal states. There, the exercise of a central-
ized power is void of any element of coordination. An example
will illustrate: the decision of the American central government
to create and maintain a military capability aimed at providing
the country with national defense is free of coordination involv-
ing the states. That decision is not the result of a failure of coop-
eration among the states, since they continue to maintain their
own militias. If centralization was an instrument of coordination,
the state militias would have some role in the provision of na-
tional defense. They have none.
In general, setting the European Union aside, it is best to keep
centralization and coordination separate. In addition, again for
the general case, centralization requires neither coordination nor
cooperation. It is simply the exercise by the central government
of the powers that have been assigned to it. That kind of centrali-
zation cannot happen in Europe as long as the European Parlia-
ment has only a power of disallowance. Centralization requires
that genuine powers be assigned.
3.3. Subsidiarity in the Contractual Model
The burden of the foregoing critique of the contractual model
of decentralization of governmental systems is that decentraliza-
tion need not beget more accountability than centralization.
Also, it is generally inappropriate to suppose that the internaliza-
tion of spillovers requires centralization. As a consequence, if our
critique is correct, the contractual model's trade-off between ac-
countability and centralization, if it exists, is not reliable. Moreo-
ver, as it now stands, the contractual model does not embody an
assignment mechanism-that is, the model does not incorporate a
set of forces that compels a society's political and legal institutions
to change the degree of centralization with respect to one power
or another.
The view of the Report of the Centre for Economic Policy
Research is that "subsidiarity is the specific claim that the burden
of proof in the process of making this trade-off [between the
claims of decentralization and those of centralization] should lie
69 See EC TREATY art. 189 (c).
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in favour of decentralization, 7 0 and "that when in doubt, decen-
tralization should be preferred."7 ' This principle
can therefore be interpreted as the expression of an essen-
tially political judgement that good government is more
likely to be under threat from failures of accountability
than from failures of cooperation, and moreover that the
kinds of distortion induced by these failures in account-
ability are of the kind that decentralization can help to al-
leviate. 72
In hands as capable as those of the authors of the Centre for
Economic Policy Research report, that view generates provoca-
tive and interesting analysis and conclusions." It does not, how-
ever, tell us where, in a theory of decentralization of governmen-
tal systems, the principle of subsidiarity should be housed and it
leaves unstated how the principle can be expected to play the role
that the Report implicitly expects it to play.
4. THE COMPETITION MODEL
In the competition model of decentralization of governmental
systems and of the assignment of powers to jurisdictional tiers,
the costs and benefits of decentralization are in effect the costs and
benefits of competition. Put differently, decentralization begets
competition and, therefore, will only be desirable if the advan-
tages of competition exceed its disadvantages. This Section first
examines the benefits of competition and therefore of decentrali-
zation, and then looks at a mechanism through which decentrali-
zation generates competition. Third, this Section will describe
how well functioning governmental systems deal with the inevi-
table costs of competition and therefore of decentralization. The
Section will conclude with a brief look at often-mentioned alter-
native advantages of decentralization.
70 MAKING SENSE OF SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 11, at 35.
71 Id. at 47.
72 id.





Broadly speaking, there are three fundamental advantages to
the competition which decentralization begets. First, competition
facilitates the control and regulation of the exercise of political
power.74 Put differently, competition insures that politicians pur-
sue the interests and the welfare of citizens. That is, of course, the
traditional case for competition. In the marketplace, it serves to
dampen and possibly eliminate the exercise of market power. In
bureaucratic organizations, it is a major contributing factor in en-
suring that subordinates pursue the interests of their superiors.
There can be no doubt that this advantage of competition is very
important for those who view the prime object of political activ-
ity as the welfare of citizens.
Competition produces other benefits. A second advantage is
that competition generates assignments of powers that correctly
reflect the relative efficiency of governments inhabiting different
jurisdictional tiers in providing the goods and services (including
redistribution) that citizens desire. Competition, in other words,
assigns supply responsibilities in such a way that the production,
distribution, and other costs of providing goods and services are
minimal. Furthermore, as Breton has shown, competition leads
to an assignment of powers that minimizes organizational costs,
75
exactly as a Breton-Scott constituent assembly would do if one
could be put in place.76 The optimality character of that assign-
ment is now recognized.77 In sum, competition is an efficient
"automatic" assignment mechanism.
In international commerce, the specializations dictated by
comparative efficiency are often impeded by tariffs, quotas, and
other barriers to trade. The same is true in governmental sys-
tems. There too, barriers of various sorts can be erected to block
the emergence of beneficial assignments or reassignments for
74 This notion played a central role in the debates of the founding fathers
of the American Republic, dominating the thinking of the authors of The Fed.
eralist Papers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 4, supra note 65; see generally
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX:
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980) (re-
enerhizing the notion).
See ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS: AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 196-227 (1996) [hereinafter
BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS].
76 See BRETON & SCOTr, ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 40.
77 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 41, at 96-101.
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which competition calls. This is an area that has barely been stud-
ied and which begs for scholarly attention.
A third benefit of decentralization and of the competition it
provokes is that jurisdictional tiers or levels will develop when-
ever such creations can produce reductions in the costs of supply-
ing goods and services; old tiers will be jettisoned when that leads
to cost reductions. In a competitive governmental system, one
therefore expects to find groupings of two, three, or more prov-
inces or states whose purpose is the internalization of externalities
and/or the exploitation of economies of scale. One also expects
to find various types of "special authorities" created to deal with
certain goods and services whose efficient provision requires spe-
cial administrative arrangements. These tiers and "mini-tiers" are
ubiquitous features of all governmental systems and are not the
product of constitutional dictates or of legal necessity. Rather,
they are the product of competition.
It may be noteworthy that even if one does encounter tiers of
all sorts in other models of decentralization, they exist in these
models, as Brennan and Buchanan have correctly indicated, in the
absence of rationality.78 The conventional and contractual models
tell us that there are advantages to decentralization. However,
they are silent on the number of tiers that exist and therefore si-
lent on the extent to which governmental systems will or should
be decentralized.
4.2. Intergovernmental Competition
At the outset, one must recall that competition in governmen-
tal systems organizes itself along two axes-horizontal and verti-
cal. The first type of competition regulates the behavior of gov-
ernments located at the same jurisdictional tier: national
governments internationally, provincial or state governments na-
tionally and internationally, and so on through the whole hierar-
chical structure. The second type controls the behavior of gov-
ernments inhabiting different jurisdictional tiers.
Before addressing the question of what drives competition, we
must consider the "objects" on which it focuses. Vertical compe-
tition, like horizontal competition, pertains to the supply of
goods and services (including redistribution). In other words,
governments compete among themselves to provide the quantity




and quality of goods and services desired by citizens at the lowest
possible tax prices, namely tax prices that correctly reflect the
marginal social costs of supply.
Given the near impossibility of Tiebout mobility in govern-
mental systems in which there are three or more tiers and given
the prevalence of such systems in reality, we assume, in order to
simplify, that fiscal mobility does not exist.71 It follows that
competition cannot have its origin in mobility. However, Pierre
Salmon has suggested an alternative mechanism which can moti-
vate competition. On strictly a priori grounds, it seems reason-
able to hold to the view that even in two-tier governmental sys-
tems (which, again, are virtually non-existent) the mechanism
proposed by Salmon is at least as, if not more, powerful than the
Tiebout mechanism.
The Salmon mechanism is an application of the theory of
rank-order tournaments in labor markets to intergovernmental
relations.8 ' The basic idea underlying the theory is that if the
costs to an employer of measuring the effort exerted by workers
is high, if the costs of measuring the productivity of one worker
relative to the productivity of another worker is low compared to
the costs of measuring the absolute productivity of workers, and
if productivity is a random variable, then by setting up a tourna-
ment, an employer makes it attractive for each worker to increase
the probability of winning the larger prize by exerting more ef-
fort.
To be able to apply the theory to intergovernmental relations
in a world in which mobility has been ruled out, Salmon postu-
lated that citizens assess their government's performance by com-
paring it to that of governments in other jurisdictions.8 2 He was
able to show that these assessments generate competition between
governments for rank order on some ordinal scale or scales. Be-
cause of performance comparisons,
79 This is a more restrictive assumption than necessary because even in
three-tier governmental systems, capital, being fungible, is mobile. However,
weakening.the assumption simply reinforces the case for decentralization based
on competition.
So See Pierre Salmon, The Logic of Pressure Groups and the Structure of the
Public Sector, 3 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 55, 55-86 (1987).
81 See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank.Order Tournaments as Op-
timum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 841-64 (1981).
82 See Salmon, supra note 80, at 32.
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
[e]ach government has an incentive to do better than gov-
ernments in other jurisdictions in terms of levels and
qualities of services, of levels of taxes or of more general
economic and social indicators. The strength of this in-
centive depends on the possibility and willingness of citi-
zens to make assessments of comparative perform-
ance-and [on] the impact these assessments have on the
well-being of politicians.8 3
As is the case with labor market tournaments in intergovern-
mental tournaments, the relationship between the effort of public
sector actors and their reward, although always stochastic, is
stronger if random disturbances affect all participants in the con-
test.
The Salmon mechanism, in other words, reveals that if citi-
zens use information about the goods and services supplied in
other jurisdictions as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of
their own governments, and if they decide to grant consent (or
votes) to their governing politicians or to withhold it from them
on the basis of that assessment, governments in different jurisdic-
tions will compete with one another. That competition will per-
sist as long as there is electoral competition within jurisdictions.
The Salmon mechanism, independently rediscovered and em-
pirically tested for certain taxes by Timothy Besley and Anne
Case,84 was developed with horizontal competition in mind. 5
The above succinct summary of the mechanism carefully outlined
it with the two broad types of competition in focus, for indeed, it
motivates vertical as well as horizontal competition. In that par-
ticular application, the mechanism provides incentives for gov-
ernments located at a given jurisdictional tier to occupy or be
ready to occupy all or a part of the powers that are assigned to
governments located at different tiers.
83 See Pierre Salmon, Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme, 3 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 24, 32 (1987).
84 See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking,
Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995).
85 See BRETON, COMPETiTiVE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 75, at 235-37
(arguing that the Salmon mechanism also provides a rationale for the docu-
metedlogistic curve that public policies trace, over time, as they diffuse from




It should be emphasized that the actual or potential occupa-
tion of the powers of another tier is not a prerogative of one par-
ticular level of government. All governments, whatever tier they
inhabit, will move to occupy a power or part thereof if they be-
lieve they can do better for "their" citizens than can the current
holder of the power. Put differently, governments will occupy a
power or a part of a power if they believe that they can provide
citizens with the same quantity and quality of a good or service at
a lower tax price, or if they think that at the prevalent tax price
they can better match the quantity and the quality of a good or
service than that offered by the current holder.
As a result, in real world governmental systems there exists a
volume of actual and potential "overlap" and "duplication" despite
the incessant efforts to eliminate them. When competition is rec-
ognized as the only force available to discipline behavior in the
public domain, deregulation will be introduced in politics as a
consequence, much as it has in some markets over recent decades.
Then, there will be a significant increase in actual and potential
overlap and duplication, as there has been in markets which have
been deregulated.
4.3. Regulating Intergovernmental Competition
To produce stable outcomes, intergovernmental competi-
tion-like competition in other contexts-must comply with cer-
tain rules. In the marketplace, the rules that regulate competition
define property rights. These rights, in turn, are enforced
through the courts. In intergovernmental competition, the rules
are also in the nature of property rights. An Article concerned
with the principle of subsidiarity need not spell them out.86 What
is significant, however, is the fact that in governmental systems,
the central governments must monitor and enforce the rules.
Consequently, at the same time that central governments compete
with junior governments in the provision of goods and services,
they are responsible for implementation of the rules that insure
orderly competition.
Federal governmental systems have resolved this inherent con-
flict of interest by designing central governments so as to repre-
sent the interests and preoccupations of junior governments and
jurisdictions qua governments and jurisdictions in the institu-
86 See ida (discussing these rules).
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tional fabric of central governments. Whenever central govern-
ments are not designed to guarantee this kind of representation,
competition can generate unstable outcomes. Because of this, the
advantages of decentralization can be less than they otherwise
could be.
4.4. A Digression
This Article has not yet addressed those alleged consequences
of decentralization that the fiscal federalism literature treats as
important virtues. Among them are an alleged greater respon-
siveness of junior (compared to senior) governments to the prefer-
ences of citizens, an alleged superiority of junior governments in
collecting information about the preferences and other relevant
circumstances of citizens, and an alleged greater propensity of jun-
ior governments to innovate. This Article agrees that these con-
sequences, if they exist, are virtues of decentralization.
Earlier, this Article argued that the proposition that junior
governments are superior in collecting information was tenable
only upon the assumption that politics and intergovernmental re-
lations were not competitive. The same is true of the other two
propositions listed in the last paragraph. While numerous exam-
ples illustrate that junior governments are more responsive to the
preferences of citizens than senior governments, other, equally vi-
able examples show the opposite.87
It is difficult, however, to dismiss the view that responsiveness
is bred by competition. In politics, as in the marketplace, "the
best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.""8 If, for any reason,
vertical competition is weak while horizontal competition is
strong, junior governments should be more responsive than sen-
ior governments to the preferences of citizens. If vertical and
horizontal competition are both vigorous, governments at all lev-
els will be equally responsive.
87 Senior governments are often more responsive than junior governments
to citizen preferences because senior governments are large enough to take into
account spillovers that citizens wish the government to deal with and, due to
economies of scale in production, to reduce production costs. Additionally,
politicians at the senior level have greater incentives to respond to citizen pref-
erences, as the costs of electoral defeat are often larger for such politicians.
88 J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly,





Note that the intuition behind the assertions found in the fis-
cal federalism literature is, at least to a degree, correct. Indeed,
given that competition derives from decentralization, it is fair to
adhere to the view that decentralization begets responsiveness.
However, in the absence of competition, there is nothing that
would induce governments located at lower tiers of the hierarchy
of governmental systems to be responsive. The same kind of rea-
soning can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the alleged greater
propensity of junior governments to innovate.
5. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
To properly understand the principle of subsidiarity, one
must appreciate the institutional context in which the principle
has officially been inserted in the historical development of the
governmental system of Europe. In the background, there was
and still is the interpretation by the European Court of Justice,
accepted by the courts of all Member States, that in cases of con-
flict between European law and national laws, the former would
have predominance over the latter, making the former a powerful
centralizing force.89 In addition, and of key importance, there are
the rules governing the decisions of the Council of Ministers in-
troduced in the Single European Act of 1987.90 By replacing una-
nimity in a whole range of issues, these new decisionmaking rules
are conducive to centralization, a tendency that in all likelihood
will be exacerbated when and as new members join the Union.
Finally, by declaring that the European Union should accord a
place to what it calls the second and third pillars, the Treaty of
Maastricht itself opened the door to further centralization.
9'
The second pillar concerns a common foreign and security
policy. According to Epoque, the documentary database of the
European Parliament, the policy "will include all questions re-
lated to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing
of a common defence policy-which might in time lead to a
89 See Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Fianze Dello Stato v. Simmen-
thal, 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (E.CJ. 1978) (holding that European Community law in-
validates conflicting national laws of member states).
90 See Single European Act, tit. 11, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R.
741 (1987)
91 See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, tits. V, VI, 0J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992).
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common defence."92 This, the document adds, will require
"systematic cooperation between Member States." 93 The third
pillar is no less impressive. It pertains to justice and home affairs
and is defined by Epoque to cover "border-related issues such as a
policy on asylum, immigration, conditions of entry and move-
ment, residence, illegal immigration and work" as well as "cross-
border criminal issues such as drugs, terrorism, fraud, and legal
cooperation on civil law, criminal law and customs."
94
In addition, one must keep in mind that the European Union,
as a governmental system, remains an incomplete democratic sys-
tem and that, as a consequence, competition operating within its
confines does not always dictate efficient assignments. The
"democratic deficit" which is on every European's lips is rooted
in the weakness of the European Parliament-in the fact that that
Parliament has a power of disallowance but no genuine constitu-
tional powers, in the sense of authority to legislate autonomously
in domains like foreign affairs, defense, and immigration. This
lack of powers most likely leads to more centralization or har-
monization than if the government in Strasbourg had more pow-
ers. The paradox of Europe is that the refusal of Member States
to assign more powers to the European Parliament-Europe's po-
tential central government-means that the system is more cen-
tralized than it would be otherwise.
Since the signing of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, much cen-
tralization of powers has taken place in Europe, and a genuine
European governmental system has been created. In such a con-
text, the principle of subsidiarity, as formulated in the Treaty of
Maastricht, must be seen as an efficient response by the govern-
ments of Member States to unshackle and redirect the forces of
competition as they impinge on the assignment of powers.
In other words, the principle of subsidiarity must be under-
stood to be a part of the political-legal-constitutional machinery
which implements the assignments and reassignments called for
by the competition that drives assignment mechanisms. In that
capacity, the principle has already begun to be used as an instru-
ment to attack and eventually bring down the barriers that cur-
92 The European Union and the Viewpoint of the European Parliament







rently prevent some efficient reassignment of powers. The prin-
ciple has empowered junior governments in their competitive
struggle with senior governments by getting political-legal-
constitutional institutions to acknowledge the greater relative effi-
ciency of junior governments in certain domains and to imple-
ment the decentralization mandated by this relatively greater sup-
ply efficiency.
Local governments within Member States are currently using
the principle of subsidiarity to deal directly with the European
Union in seeking the decentralization, to local jurisdictions, of
powers or of parts of powers that are currently assigned to Brus-
sels.95 These same local governments are also beginning to use
subsidiarity to obtain more devolution within Member States.96
Additionally, subsidiarity has affected assignments between
Member States and the Council of Ministers. Over time, one
must expect the "real" constitution of Europe to reflect the influ-
ence of this decentralizing principle in a marked way.
6. CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed a number of approaches to the de-
centralization of governmental systems, while trying at all times
to identify two things: first, the benefits of decentralization, and
second, an appropriate niche for the principle of subsidiarity, a
niche that would provide it with a useful meaning and a signifi-
cant role in a coherent theory of decentralization.
This Article has been critical of the conventional approach to
decentralization, arguing that it provides no ground for thinking
that decentralization is beneficial. This Article has also argued
that the more recent contractual approach, because it is con-
structed on a much too restrictive conception of politics, is also
wanting. Finally, this Article has argued that an approach which
equates the virtues of decentralization with those of competition
permits an appreciation of the true benefits of decentralization
while at the same time providing a natural habitat for the princi-
ple of subsidiarity.
" See Rodney A.W. Rhodes, THE EUROPEANISATION OF SUB-CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF THE UK, in STAATSWISSENCHSFTEN UND
STAATSPRAXIS 272-86 (Vol. 2, No. 3. Jahrgang, 1992).
16 See id
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